

The text of the resolution adopted by the Extraordinary General Meeting of the Company on 5 December 2016, i.e. following resumption of the General Meeting previously adjourned on 29 November 2016.

Resolution no 1
of 5 November 2016
of the Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders
of CD PROJEKT S.A. with a registered office in Warsaw
concerning changes in the Company Articles of Association and empowerment of the
Supervisory Board to collate the unified text of the amended Articles of Association

§ 1

Pursuant to Art. 430 of the Commercial Company Code the Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of CD PROJEKT S.A., headquartered in Warsaw (hereafter referred to as “**the Company**”) decides to amend the Company’s Articles of Association (hereafter referred to as “**the Articles**”) by extending §25 with two sections, labeled §25a and §25b, with the following content:

„§ 25a.

1. Except as specified in §25b, the voting rights of each Company Shareholder (defined in section 2 below) are restricted in such a way that no single Shareholder may exercise more than 20% of the total number of votes afforded by Company shares on the date of the General Meeting.
2. For the purposes of §25a and §25b, a Company shareholder (hereafter referred to as “**the Shareholder**”, or, collectively, as “**the Shareholders**”) is defined as any party which (i) holds shares of Company stock, or (ii) is authorized to cast votes at the General Meeting on any legal grounds, even when such a party does not directly hold shares of Company stock and instead acts in the capacity of:
 - a) a plenipotentiary;
 - b) an usufructee or pledgee;
 - c) a holder of a depositary receipt pursuant to the provisions of the Act on the Trade in Financial Instruments of 29 July 2005 (Journal of Laws, 2014, item 94 with subsequent changes);
 - d) a party to which the right to cast votes has been delegated;
 - e) a holder of any other relevant legal title.
3. If a party controls two or more batches of votes under different legal titles, the votes controlled by the Shareholder are cumulated.
4. If the cumulative total specified in section 3 above exceeds the 20% of the total number of votes at the General Meeting, these votes are subject to reduction as specified in section 8 below.
5. Regardless of the conditions specified above, entities between whom a relation of domination or dependence exists, pursuant to section 6 below, are deemed to constitute a group (hereafter referred to as “**the Group**”) and their votes are cumulated. If the cumulative total specified in this section exceeds the 20% of the total number of votes at the General Meeting, these votes are subject to reduction as specified in section 8 below.
6. A Group is assumed to exist when:
 - a) (i) one of the parties involved is the parent company of the remaining parties, or (ii) the Shareholder is the parent company of the remaining parties pursuant

to the provisions of the Commercial Company Code (Journal of Laws, 2016, item 1578, unified text);

- b) (i) one of the parties involved has the status of the dominant undertaking with regard to the remaining parties, or (ii) the parties involved are simultaneously the dominant and dependent undertakings with regard to one another, pursuant to the provisions of the Anti-Trust and Consumer Protection Act of 16 February 2007 (Journal of Laws, 2015, item 184 with subsequent changes);
 - c) one of the parties involved is (i) the parent entity, (ii) a higher-order parent entity, (iii) a subsidiary, (iv) a lower-order subsidiary or (v) both the parent entity (of arbitrary order) and a subsidiary (of arbitrary order, including partially owned subsidiaries) of the remaining parties, pursuant to the provisions of the Accounting Act of 29 September 1994 (Journal of Laws, 2016, item 1047);
 - d) one of the parties involved is either (i) the parent entity or (ii) a subsidiary of one of the remaining parties pursuant to the provisions of the Act on Public Offerings, Conditions Governing the Introduction of Financial Instruments to Organized Trading, and Public Companies of 29 July 2005 (hereafter referred to as “**the Offerings Act**”) (Journal of Laws, 2016, item 1639, unified text).
7. If a dominance or dependence relation between any two Shareholders (as defined in section 2 above) exists (as defined in section 5 above), these Shareholders are automatically deemed to constitute a Group and their votes are subjected to cumulation. When, as a result of this cumulation, the number of votes controlled by the Group exceeds 20% of the total number of votes, these votes are subject to reduction as specified in section 8 below.
8. Reduction of votes is defined as a decrease in the aggregate number of votes appertaining to a Shareholder or Shareholders (regardless of whether they belong to a Group or are subject to cumulation based on the abovementioned rules) at the General Meeting in such a way that:
- a) the number of votes appertaining to the shareholder who controlled the greatest number of votes prior to cumulation is decreased, except as specified in item d) below, by the difference between the number of votes originally controlled and 20% of the total number of votes.
 - b) if, despite the reduction specified in item a) above, the aggregate number of votes appertaining to parties whose votes are subject to cumulation continues to exceed 20% of the total number of votes, except as specified in item d) below, the votes of additional parties are reduced in the order determined by the number of votes controlled prior to reduction (greatest to smallest). This procedure is repeated until the cumulated votes constitute not more than 20% of the total number of votes;
 - c) when two or more parties control the same number of votes subject to cumulation, reduction is carried out proportionally with fractional votes rounded down.
 - d) in all circumstances each party whose votes are subject to reduction in accordance with items a) – c) above retains the right to cast at least a single vote.
9. Each Shareholder intending to take part in the General Meeting, whether directly or through a plenipotentiary, is obligated to provide an unsolicited written notice to the Management Board not later than 7 days before the convocation of the General Meeting to the effect that they control, directly or indirectly, more than 20% of the total number of votes. This notice shall be deemed effectively delivered if it is

received by the Management Board not later than on the deadline specified in this section.

10. The duty specified in section 9 above also applies separately to each Shareholder belonging to a Group. The corresponding notice should list all entities or Group members whose votes are subject to cumulation along with the number of votes controlled by each member prior to reduction, as specified in section 8 above.

11. The restriction specified in section 1 above does not apply to the duties of major shareholders as set forth in the Offerings Act.

§ 25b.

1. The voting restriction specified in §25a section 1 above shall not apply to parties controlling 50% or more than 50% of the total number of votes in the Company when the shares have been purchased by way of a public tender offer to acquire all remaining shares of the Company (hereafter referred to as “**the Tender**”) pursuant to Art. 74 section 1 of the Offerings Act.

2. If, following conclusion of the Tender, the party or parties who originally called the Tender control less than 50% of the total number of votes, the restriction specified in §25a section 1 above shall continue to apply to those parties.”

§ 2

The Extraordinary General Meeting hereby empowers the Supervisory Board to collate the unified text of the Company Articles acknowledging the amendments introduced in §1 of this resolution.

§ 3

The resolution enters into force on the date of its enactment, with the exception of the amendments to the Company Articles regarding the introduction of §25a i §25b, as set forth in §1. This amendment will become legally binding on the date of registration of the amended Company Articles by the appropriate court of registration.

Management Board justification concerning draft resolution no. 3:

The proposed change in the Company Articles concerns a voting limitation imposed upon shareholders (or group of shareholders) who control more than 20% of the total number of votes. This limitation is only lifted when the given shareholder (or group of shareholders) issues a public tender offer to acquire all remaining shares of the Company at a specified price, and, as a result of this offer, assumes control of more than 50% of the total number of votes. The aim of this exception is to induce the tender caller to propose a more equitable share purchase price, which, in turn, should enable minority shareholders to make a rational decision concerning potential sale of their shares.

It should also be noted that the proposed change in the Company Articles serves to protect the interests of all Company shareholders in the event a major investor emerges but does not extend an equitable share purchase offer to all existing shareholders. Under such circumstances the new provisions would mitigate the risk of chaos and potential confrontation which might arise if the Company is targeted by a major investor whose goals conflict with the Company’s creative vision and growth strategy* as well as the core values and principles which have guided CD PROJEKT since its inception.

Mandatory buyout of shares held by minority shareholders during a takeover is not a novel solution. To the contrary – it is espoused by many Western European legal codes which acknowledge the need to protect minority interests when control changes occur at the company. This realization dates back to the 20th century, with the corresponding guarantees first enshrined by the United Kingdom in *The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers*, adopted

in the early 1970s. The solution proposed by the Management Board is widely known and encountered in many European jurisdictions. It has also been formally sanctioned by the European Union, as specified in Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 21 April 2004 concerning takeover offers.

In line with the directive, it is incumbent on the UE Member States to guarantee that, when a takeover of a public company is attempted, the would-be acquirer must extend an offer to purchase all outstanding shares of the Company from existing shareholders at a set price. The vote threshold beyond which a shareholder is deemed to be attempting to acquire the company and is therefore obligated to issue such an offer, is left for the Member States to determine. The Polish Act on Public Offerings, Conditions Governing the Introduction of Financial Instruments to Organized Trading, and Public Companies specifies a threshold of 66%. This is unusually high – in fact, effective takeover of a public company can be executed with a far lower capital involvement. Note that in other EU Member States similar thresholds are pegged at a much lower and more realistic value – typically 33% (Greece, France, Luxembourg, Portugal or Slovakia), 30% (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK) or 25% of the total number of votes (Slovenia, Hungary).

Based on its longstanding experience the Management Board is convinced that uncompromising dedication to quality, both within and beyond the Company – including shareholder relations – constitutes the very foundation of CD PROJEKT's commercial success. The Board also firmly believes that mutual trust among shareholders as well as between shareholders and the Board is a cornerstone upon which the Company's lasting value is founded. In order to better protect the interests of shareholders (both existing and prospective) and to foster mutual trust based on the appreciation of one another's interests – and, by extension, the interests of the Company, the Management Board proposes the abovementioned changes in the Company Articles. These changes improve upon the protection of Company shareholders provided for in the applicable legislation. In the Management Board's opinion realizing this goal is contingent upon providing Company shareholders with the opportunity to make an informed choice whether to remain at the Company and contribute to its growth or to abandon the Company at an early stage of a takeover attempt initiated by a strategic investor. An additional goal is to ensure that conditions under which shareholders may be enticed to abandon the Company are equitable and reflect the real value of the Company. The proposed change embodies, to the greatest possible extent, a fundamental principle of the capital market: shareholder equality. This is achieved by respecting the interests of minority shareholders which, in the Management Board's opinion, have always represented a significant contribution to the Company's overall growth.

* The Strategy of the CD PROJEKT Capital Group for the years 2016 – 2021 can be found at <https://www.cdprojekt.com/en/capital-group/strategy/>